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Russian Resource-Extraction Companies: Conservation of Enclaves of Wealth VS. Movement Toward Integrated Economy

Russian Resource-Extraction Companies: Conservation of Enclaves of Wealth VS. Movement Toward Integrated Economy

Journal of Institutional Studies, , Vol. 13 (no. 1),

The article is devoted to the comprehensive assessment of the Russian resource-extraction companies’ readiness for the development of the domestic markets, which is an important condition for the formation of an integrated national economy. Currently, Russian economy development is mainly due to the functioning of the export and raw materials sector. This phenomenon leads to the emergence of enclaves of wealth, which do not have any impact on the development of the rest of the economy, and they are connected through short vertical value chains with global markets of raw materials and low added value commodities. Methodological approaches of the study are represented with the concept of dual enclave economy, the concept of global value chains and the concept of discrete structural alternatives. Annual reports of companies and business groups are the primary sources of data. Apparatus of the theory of fuzzy sets and the algorithm of fuzzy inference of Sugeno-0 order were chosen as research methods. The fulfilled analyses show that State-owned enterprises and companies that affiliated closely with the State are characterized with high level of readiness for the development of domestic markets. At the same time, private resource-extraction companies demonstrate medium and low levels. It is concluded that high level of readiness of State-owned enterprises is linked with the implementation of the «coercion to innovations» public policy. This policy consists in the need for companies with state participation to adopt innovation development programs, which included increasing the budget resources for R&D, implementation of innovation activities and the modernization of industries. Furthermore, companies/business groups with state participation invest significant resources in fulfilling quasi-public obligations to the population in the regions of economic activities. This is one of the conditions to obtain various privileges and benefits provided by the State (for instance, exclusive access to new hydrocarbon deposits). At the same time, the question about «soft» methods to involve Russian resource-extraction companies/business groups into innovation process on the domestic markets is still open.

Keywords: global value chains; export-resource sector; big business; enclaves of wealth; integrated economy

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