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The modeling of corruption economics: theoretical approaches

The modeling of corruption economics: theoretical approaches

Journal of Economic Regulation, , Vol. 6 (no. 4),

The increasing scale of corruption risk in public procurement system requires the intensification of theoretical analyses of existing models in the sphere of corruption economics and estimation of international experience in their practical applications. Two models of the economics of corruption were analyzed: static model of rent acquisition, C. Rose-Ackerman's dynamic model of corruption and F. T. Lui dynamic model. Thereupon, the disqualification institution applied in developed countries and Russian institution of unfair suppliers list were estimated. The author made conclusion of high efficiency of public control institution as preventing and correctional measure for reducing corruption.

Keywords: corruption; corruption risk; model of rent acquisition; dynamic model of corruption; disqualification institution; unfair suppliers list; public control

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Publisher: Ltd. "Humanitarian perspectives"
Founder: Ltd. "Humanitarian perspectives"
Online ISSN: 2412-6047
ISSN: 2078-5429