

НОВАЯ МОДЕЛЬ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЯ: АЛЬТЕРНАТИВНЫЙ ПОДХОД

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Данная статья посвящена анализу предвыборных процессов в Армении. Основная идея статьи состоит в том, что по модели Даунса можно прогнозировать результаты выборов. Для этого нужно учесть, представители каких направлений избираются. В работе направлениями считаются власти, оппозиция и компромиссные силы. В отличие от идеи Даунса, где голоса избирателей разделяются между правыми и левыми, в статье избиратель в постсоветских странах, и в частности в Армении, где институты демократии находятся на низком уровне развития, выбирает между оппозицией и властью.

Кроме того, в статье проводится анализ политических деловых циклов в Армении и в России (как основного наследника СССР), выявляются их отличия и сходства. В результате получена политическая технология и для оппозиции, и для властей, и для избирателей. Технология оппозиции дает возможность кандидату выиграть выборы, улучшая позицию избирателей. Технология властей предполагает ситуацию "нет сдвигов" - власть сохраняет данную ситуацию, не ухудшая позицию избирателей. Технология избирателей - когда за счет рациональных ожиданий избиратели улучшают свою позицию. В этом случае не важно кто выигрывает, так как оба варианта приносят одинаковую "полезность". В рамках последней технологии мы получаем кривые безразличия избирателей. В работе определены "бюджетные ограничения". Научная новизна статьи состоит в том, что микрометодом (принцип максимизации полезности) решается макропроблема.

Ключевые слова: кривые безразличия; политические процессы; позиция избирателей; новая модель избирателя.

ALTERNATIVE TO OPPOSITION AND THE POWER

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The paper is devoted to the election processes in Armenia. The main idea of the paper is that according to the Downs' model we can predict election results, basing on the directions of the elected representatives. In areas considered to be the power, the opposition and compromise power. In contrast to the Downs' ideas, where voters split between right and left, in the paper the voter in post-Soviet countries, particularly in Armenia, where the institutions of democracy are at low development levels, chooses between the opposition and the authorities.

Additionally, the author analyzes the political business cycle in Armenia and Russia (as the main successor to the USSR), identifies the differences and similarity. As a result, we make political tool for the opposition, the authorities and for the voters. First technology allows the opposition's candidate to win the election, improving the position of the voters. Power technology assumes a situation of "no

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changes" - the power remains the situation without compromising the position of the voters. Technology voters - when by the rational expectations voters improve their position. In this case, no matter who wins, as both versions bring the equal "utility". The latest technology, the author obtains the indifference curves of voters. "Budget constraints" are defined in the paper. Scientific novelty of the paper is that by the micro method (the principle of utility maximization) the author tries to solve the macro problem.

Keywords: indifference curves; political processes; position of voters; new model of a voter.

JEL: D71, D72, D78, H25, P48.

Introduction

After disorder of the USSR, on the post-Soviet territory the new epoch has begun: the countries have passed from a planned economy to market economy, from command managements to democracy.

This transition was accompanied by the emergence of new phenomena.

Political business cycles became one of the new phenomena. In Armenia and in Russia the opportunism of politicians, which is expressed in aspiration to keep the power by any methods is shown strongly than in the developed countries.

This phenomenon is included into the contradiction with economic expectations of the voters. For reception the voices of the voters politicians resort to various forms of a manipulation. Finally, they aspire to receive the political rent to use it for preservation and strengthening of the power. Process gets lines of law and for a long time already demands in a politic-economical estimation.

It is no coincidence that in these days the research on the subject became very important in economic interest groups. One part of the economists, conducting research, performs social order, the other part is trying to find objective laws, determining the success or failure during the elections.

The economists are focused in this since 1971 (*Kramer, 1971; Tufte, 1975; Nordhaus, 1975*). Of course the idea of the existence of business relationships exist for much longer, so at Schumpeter's idea of slipping on the political nature of business cycles (*Schumpeter, 1939*).

There are many researchers among Post-Soviet scientists, which were interested in these problems, and made very important results. We can't notice the works of R. Nureev (*Нуреев, 2001*), V. Mau (*Мау, Кочеткова и Яновский, 2001*), L. Polischuk, A. Zaostrovtshev (*Заостровцев, 2009*), A. Akaev (*Акаев, 2008, С. 29-33*) and others.

In the paper considerable space is devoted to the works of A. Downs (*Downs, 1957. P. 28*) and W. Nordhaus.

But in this paper, in contrast to the major works on the subject of the political business cycle, the emphasis is not on the behavior of politicians contrary behavior of voters is the subject of the study.

1. Basics of the electoral behavior

The main figure in politics is the voter. To understand who is a voter, and his value for elected candidate (party) is an important issue for the development of the entire political program. Voter does not really need the promise of a candidate (party), it is necessary to solve the problems facing it and to satisfy their "needs." This situation is very similar to the behavior of the consumer market. If a consumer wants to business professionals decide the challenges ahead and granted his wishes, voters expect from political forces creating political stability (stable inflation, low unemployment, free business environment, etc.). But the modern voter presents and new desires: for it is not only important resolving the above issues, it is important and the process of how this will happen. For voters have importance such things as access to politicians for the contact, the desire to communicate, a new culture, ease the process of acquisition of public goods, the additional "benefits" that can give politician in this process.

The term «electoral behavior» can be defined as the behavior exhibited by the voters in the search, selection, estimation and utilization of political programs which can provide political stability.

There are whole series of principles for the analyzing the voters. First of all, the study of applied behavioral disciplines is a good way to understand the behavior of the voters. Voting behavior is a complex and multifaceted process and for its learning is necessary to use an interdisciplinary approach - techniques and methods used in psychology and sociology. Research can be carried out using different methods to monitor the behavior (experiments, the use of sociological surveys, questionnaires, interviews, etc.). It is also advisable to study separate stages of the decision-making process about choice.

For further analysis of voting behavior will give some definition.

Any political system as the economic one faces a dilemma: on the one hand, the needs of society are limitless, totally insatiable, on the other hand, society's resources are needed for the production of goods, limited or rare. The problem of limited resources is a fundamental issue for both economists and policy makers.

If in the consumer behavior of production possibilities curve (PPC) shows the maximum amount of simultaneous production of two (or more) goods with given resources and technology available to the society, in the electoral behavior, this curve shows the whole possible effective political decisions regarding economic policy. Choosing one policy it's necessary to endow the other options. Society has to choose policy for its further development. This problem of the choice was faced by all economic and political systems in the past, is today and will be tomorrow. Summarizing, we can say that in theory PPC of the electoral behavior coincides with the curve of the contracts.

As shown in Fig. 1, in this case, the voter chooses between the economic policies that offer candidate (party).




Fig. 1. Political production possibilities curves

Let us assume politicians before elections may offer PPC II (instead of the existing PPC I). In this case, the voter must choose a point B because of all the possible options (points A, C, D, E) once she is on the curve II. As a result, the candidate (party) A wins the election. However, to maximize the effectiveness of economic policy, the candidate (party) A must form a coalition with the candidate B. Before any elections candidate (or party) promised new level of the PPC (See Fig. 1). In the next election, the candidate (party) will seek to implement the new CPV III, which provides higher level of efficiency of the economic policies. How voters will choose in this case, we consider later.

Clear that each voter has certain preferences, therefore, there are specific ratios of these preferences in the economic policy of the candidate (party) A and B.

We suppose that all these ratios are equal to him, that is, voter does not care what set to choose. Consequently, the components of economic policy belong to the set of indifference. Set of indifference is a collection of the electoral choice options, each of

which provides the same level of welfare and therefore does not have preference over others.

Indifference curve is a graphic display of the set of indifference (see Fig. 2a). Indifference curve is the set of components of economic policy, providing voters an equal amount of economic stability, that is, bringing him the same level of welfare. Taking the other possible combinations of these components, corresponding to different values of economic prosperity, we can make a map of indifference. Map of the indifference curves is a collection of the indifference curves corresponding to different levels of welfare for a single voter. Political preferences of the voters seem indifference maps. Each of the following indifference curves passing away from the origin suggests a relatively high level of prosperity (see Fig. 2b).




Fig. 2. Indifference curves of the voter

While indifference curves describe the system of voter preferences, the budget line represents the set of available options for him.

The budget constraint shows which sets of components of economic policy available voters in this stage of development of the economy and at this level of development of democratic institutions. The budget constraint is given by the function $W = f(aA, \beta B)$, where

W - Welfare of every voter,

a, β - coefficient of efficiency of economic policy A and B .

In our further discussions, we assume that this connection is linear and is described by the budget constraints

$$aA + \beta B \leq W.$$

The fiscal space is the entire area accessible voter choice (see Fig. 3). In the figure is shaded triangle bounded by the budget line and the coordinate axes. The line of the budget constraint in the simplest case is described by the equation

$$aA + \beta B = W$$

The budget line shows various combinations of the two economic policies' components that are available to voters at this stage of economic development.

Budget line contains information about the level of welfare of the voter and the effectiveness of any proposed policy. In other words, it shows voters' all available combinations of the economic policies' components Indifference curves carry subjective information about the preferences of voters and are based on sets of indifference. Combining the budget lines and the indifference map, we can find the optimum for the voter.

The voter's equilibrium position reached at the point B (see Fig. 4), in which the budget line tangent to the curve of indifference. At the point of the consumer optimum match angles of the budget line (a/β) and the indifference curve (MRS). Marginal rate of substitution MRS shows proportions in which voter wants to exchange components of the economic program A and B . The ratio of a/β shows in what proportion the voter can

exchange these components.




Fig. 3. The budget line




Fig. 4. Graphical interpretation of the electoral equilibrium

The interpretation of the marginal rate of substitution as the ratio of the minimum conditions welfare in program A and B allows us to express the voter's equilibrium condition in the following form:

$$MW_A/MW_B = \alpha/\beta \quad \text{or} \quad MW_A/\alpha = MW_B/\beta.$$

2. General Equilibrium

In this section we will combine production possibilities curves and voters' community indifference curves in order to create a model of the political environment as a whole. This brings together politicians, who must decide which combination of components of the economic policy "produce" in the given level of the economic development and democracy institutions, and voters who choose which combination of the proposed policies provides the greatest level of welfare. Politicians, acting rationally, will be efficient by choosing that policy or program which maximizes their popularity and authority among voters; and voters, also acting rationally, are considered efficient by choosing the combination of the proposed policies which maximizes their welfare. The main question is how these two separate choices, by politicians and voters, coincide.

In our discussion, we already introduced the concept of a budget constraint. This constraint had two characteristics. The first was that it divided policy bundles into two sets, those which were affordable given the voters in the given economy, and those which were beyond the voters reach. The second characteristic was the budget lines slope. This represented the relative efficiency ratio of the policy on the horizontal axis divided by the efficiency ratio of the policy on the vertical axis. In this capacity the budget line

served the function of what we will call efficiency line. An efficiency line is an important tool because its slope reveals relative efficiency.

Recall that relative efficiency is the efficiency of the policy in terms of another policy. In the case of the voter, the relative efficiency of the policy *A* is the level welfare of the policy *B* the voter forgoes. The consumer of course pays the producer. Therefore, the relative efficiency the policy would be the number of votes the politician gets during the election (a/β).

Politicians

The slope of the PPC is the marginal rate of transformation (*MRT*), or in other words, we identified the PPC in politics with contract curves the “cost” of an additional contract on the horizontal axis in terms of the amount of the contracts on vertical axis that must be sacrificed. As a result of being on the PPF, in order to “sign” a new contract the politician must necessarily “cancel” the other one.

Maximization of the politician’s popularity and authority occurs when the additional contracts are equal to the additional votes, which are the result of the changes in the policy *A* by his own, and policy *B* by his competitor. Referring to Fig. 5, at point *A* the slope of the efficiency line is equal to the slope of the PPC. This is equivalent to $a/\beta = MRT$. At this point, both politicians’ popularity and voters’ welfare are maximized.




Fig. 5. Maximization of the politician’s popularity and authority

Voters

Recall that indifference curves are graphing of voter preferences. Each combination of economic policies’ components on the indifference curve provides the same level of welfare for the voter. The voter’s task is to maximize his welfare. This combination of policy components was determined graphically by reaching the highest feasible indifference.




Fig. 6. Maximization of the voters’ welfare

This was shown in Fig. 6 at point *C* as the tangency of the indifference curve to a budget constraint. At this tangency, the Marginal Rate of Substitution (*MRS*), the slope of the indifference curve, is equal to relative efficiency the slope of the budget constraint. In other words, $\alpha/\beta = MRS$. Fig. 7 illustrates several possible choices that society (politicians and voters) might wish to achieve. Combination *A* falling inside the PPC is clearly not an optimal choice since more of both policies' components could be obtained.




Fig. 7. Possible contracts between politicians and voters

Combination *B* falling on the PPC exhausts society's possible decisions but again is not welfare maximizing since other feasible combinations of components lie above this indifference curve and are therefore preferred. Combination *C* also exhausts all possibilities of the society but in this case no other feasible combination provides a higher welfare level. Combination *C*'s indifference curve is tangent to the PPC. Combination *D* lies beyond the PPC and consequently cannot be "produced" by the politicians (see Fig. 8).




Fig. 8. General equilibrium

Combination *C* is the optimal combination but the question is how does society get to it. The answer is the role of efficiencies. If politicians and voters are both optimizers, they will respond to efficiency changes.

General equilibrium occurs at point *C* where $MRS = \alpha/\beta = MRT$ (See Fig. 8).

3. New model of a voter

As already mentioned, the choice of the political program isn't the goal for the

voter. It's a means, that's why it's necessary to clarify what is the goal itself.

Assumption 1. Goal the voters in the political process is to improve (or if not worse) their welfare level.

$$W_t \geq W_{t-1},$$

where:

W_t – level of the voter's welfare after elections,

W_{t-1} – level of the voter's welfare before elections.

Let us consider this goal in the methodological diagram of the target (see Fig. 9)




Fig. 9. The scheme of the voter's goal
Compiled by the author.

This scheme aims to include all the factors of influence in the space, to achieve the goal. Application of the scheme to the voter's target, creates opportunities for the emergence of an alternative to the classical electoral behavior theory. As almost all the "classical" theories (Berelson, Lazarfeld and McPhee, 1954. P. 331; Knoke, 1990; Bartels, 2010; Sanders, Clarke, Stewart and Whiteley, 2011) describe voter's behavior during the election process, that's why behavior of the politicians is in the center researchers.

With the new model, we try to solve some problems of the "classical theory."

Voter's participation in the elections

One of the major problems in classical theory is the solution of voters participate in the elections or not.

By this model, voter will participate in the elections if

- external factors affect more than internal, and supportive factors great preventing ones;
- the impact of domestic factors covers the influence of external factors, but the other factors prevented more than supported.

In these two cases, the voter has the motivation to participate, as it can affect the course of changes (self-realization).

When the support and internal factors exceed correspondingly preventing and external factors, or conversely, there is no reason for the voter to participate. In the first case, he is satisfied and is indifferent to the elections, as it has a satisfactory level of

economic welfare and freedom of actions. In the opposite case, he does not vote because he thinks that cannot change anything.

Equilibrium of the voter

Equilibrium of a voter occurs when the external and internal factors cover each other, and the impact supporting factors are not weaker than preventing's.

It is very clearly illustrated that domestic factors generate preferences, external ones put them into the framework, limited this preferences.

Supporting and preventing factors reflect the objective situation in the study area, showing its potential.

Recalling definitions in section **Basics of the electoral behavior**, it is clear that the new model of the voter objectively expresses all the positions of the voter and creates the preconditions for the development of a political technology.

4. Private case of the model A. Downs

As everywhere, in the Post-Soviet countries (particularly, in Armenia) too, all participants of the political process tend to maximize their utilities.

Anthony Downs formed a fundamental hypothesis: "the party rather form policies to win the election, but did not win the election in order to conduct politics (*Downs, 1957. P. 28*). "To this end, Downs presents political competition, by analogy with the one-dimensional model of the spatial differentiation of the market.

As an example, Downs used the distribution of votes in accordance with their ideological preferences. Note the horizontal axis is the position of voters from the extreme left to the extreme right (see Fig. 10).




Fig. 10. Distribution of votes according to their ideological preferences

If the position of the voters are distributed between the extremes of society equally, we obtain a normal distribution with a peak of over a point M . in the middle of axis denote the position of the median voter point M (Fig. 10). The total area under the curve represents 100% of the voting. Suppose that voters cast their votes to those who are closest to them in their ideologies.

In countries where the development of democratic institutions at low levels, because of the lack of mature political culture change the axis of the model E . Downs, and instead of left and right, take part in the election of the opposition and the government. If a candidate chooses the middle position (at point M), then it will receive at least 50% of the vote. If the candidate takes a position, he will get less than 50% of the vote. If a candidate takes a position at point A , and the other at the point M , point A

candidate receives votes that are left of the line A' (middle position between A and M), that's minority votes. The candidate, who takes a position M , will be able to vote, is the right of line A' that's majority (see Fig. 11).




Fig. 11. Distribution of votes between the government and opposition

The best strategy for the candidate will be as close to the position of the median voter, as it would provide him the most votes in the election. A similar situation occurred when one of the candidates will be to the right of the other (take a position at the point B). Obviously, our party A and B will tend to the center to win the election (see Fig. 12).

And in this case, the victory will go to those who best reflect the position of centrist of the voter. The problem is, however, a precise definition (identification) of the interests and aspirations of the median voter.

Consider a situation where the fight takes a third candidate. For example, one candidate is in position B , and the other two - the position M . Then the first will get to vote under the distribution curve to the right of the line B' , and each of the other two - half of the votes, lying to the left of this line (see Fig. 12).




Fig. 11. Movement to the center in the model Downs

Therefore the majority of votes will win the first candidate. If one of the two candidates would have taken a position, the candidate takes a position M , would receive a small percentage of votes equal to the area under the distribution curve between A' and B' . Therefore, the candidate M has an incentive to get out of the segment AB , thus it makes one of the two other candidates in an awkward position. The process of promotion cannot continue for long, but it has its limits. While the peak of the distribution is at the point M , any candidate can increase their chances of moving in the direction of

Just such a situation found in Armenia, where the opposition cannot unite. Because of the lack of a single opposition candidate, the votes of each candidate's opposition decrease, resulting in the authorities and the candidate wins the election.

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