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The Comparative Analysis of Vertical Restraints Regulation

The Comparative Analysis of Vertical Restraints Regulation

Journal of Institutional Studies, , Vol. 8 (no. 4),

Comparison the way of vertical restraints regulation in the United States, the European Union and the Russian Federation is the subject to certain difficulties arising from their belonging to different types of legal system. The United States legal system belongs to the family of common law, while in the European Union and the Russian Federation operates a family of civil law.
Historically, the countries that were colonies of Great Britain (the US, Canada, India, Australia) steel continue the tradition of the Anglo-Saxon legal system. The civil law system dominates in Continental Europe and, consequently, in those countries that were formerly colonies of France, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Portugal. Separately to this list should include Russia and Japan.
Common and civil law systems differ significantly. The common law system is characterized by a decisive role of precedents. This fact explains that in the United States the judge acts as arbiter. In contrast, the European Union civil law concept implies the existence of detailed system of rules and principles, clearly defining the regulation process for every specific area of law enforcement. Thus, every legal system determines its own peculiarities practice of vertical restraints regulation.
Considering the differences of vertical restraints regulation the attention should paid not only the type of the country legal system, but also the interaction between the economic theory and the antitrust law, because the theoretical analysis played a crucial role in the regulation norms evolution.

Keywords: antitrust, vertical restraints, Sherman antitrust act, Guidelines on vertical restraints, common law, civil law.

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