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Alternative to Opposition and the Power

Alternative to Opposition and the Power

Journal of Economic Regulation, , Vol. 5 (no. 1),
p. 46-57

The paper is devoted to the election processes in Armenia. The main idea of the paper is that according to the Downs' model we can predict election results, basing on the directions of the elected representatives. In areas considered to be the power, the opposition and compromise power. In contrast to the Downs' ideas, where voters split between right and left, in the paper the voter in post - Soviet countries, particularly in Armenia, where the institutions of democracy are at low development levels, chooses between the opposition and the authorities.
Additionally, the author analyzes the political business cycle in Armenia and Russia (as the main successor to the USSR), identifies the differences and similarity. As a result, we make political tool for the opposition, the authorities and for the voters. First technology allows the opposition's candidate to win the election, improving the position of the voters. Power technology assumes a situation of "no changes" - the power remains the situation without compromising the position of the voters. Technology voters - when by the rational expectations voters improve their position. In this case, no matter who wins, as both versions bring the equal "utility". The latest technology, the author obtains the indifference curves of voters. "Budget constraints" are defined in the paper. Scientific novelty of the paper is that by the micro method (the principle of utility maximization) the author tries to solve the macro problem.


Keywords: indifference curves; political processes; position of voters; new model of a voter

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Publisher: Ltd. "Humanitarian perspectives"
Founder: Southern Federal University
ISSN: 2078-5429