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Institutional analysis and its internal heterogeneity: causes and consequences

Institutional analysis and its internal heterogeneity: causes and consequences

Journal of Economic Regulation, , Vol. 4 (no. 3),
p. 81-102

This paper deals with the problem of heterogeneity of institutional analysis, establishing the cause and effect of this heterogeneity. Particular emphasis is placed on the occurrence of two schools - the old and the new institutionalism, which are distinguished by the ratio of neoclassical analysis and the assumptions, as well as the method used understanding of economic phenomena. Diversification of institutional analysis is superior variety of neoclassical analysis, which is caused by the complexity of the object and the subject of the study, specific knowledge of methods of economic research and the inherent limitations of a descriptive method. However, the problem of allocating significant determinants of institutional change and economic growth, is preserved in the neo-classical, and institutionalism. Modern economics, despite the clear separation of the individual approaches, though not characterized by such a clear dividing lines between the earlier neo-classical and institutional analysis. The author highlights the most important themes of "old" institutional academic research program, is a problem of statics and dynamics in terms of the institutional approach


Keywords: institutional analysis; heterogeneity; the old and the new institutionalism; statics; dynamics; "mainstream "; the problem of choice

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Publisher: Ltd. "Humanitarian perspectives"
Founder: Southern Federal University
ISSN: 2078-5429