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Power - property core of economic development: the cases of Russia and South Korea

Power - property core of economic development: the cases of Russia and South Korea

Journal of Economic Regulation, , Vol. 3 (no. 4),
p. 98-108

The authors argue that some peculiarities of national development strategies may be described and explained with the help of the power - property concept which is used as a complement to the Economic Freedom surveys methodology. A cluster analysis approach is used to reveal the discrepancies in development strategies of Russia and of South Korea. The authors claim that factors which influence those discrepancies are mostly institutional and cultural attributes that concern the power - property phenomenon.


Keywords: economic development; Russia; South Korea; power - property

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