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Dynamic interaction in a sequential (non-repeatable) investing

Journal of Economic Regulation, , Vol. 3 (no. 4),
p. 44-58

The paper is devoted to theoretical studies of the dynamic performances hold-up problem, matter of the serial (non-repeatable) investment. In addition, the different attitudes revealed in various scientific publications, on the example «Hold-up and sequential specific investment» by Smirnov and White (2004) and «Sequential Investment, Hold-up, and Strategic Delay» by J. Zhang and Y. Zhang (2011), to a successive mode of investment as a possible way of the «blackmail» problem elimination.

Keywords: hold-up problem; specific investments; sequential investment; timing of investments

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Publisher: Ltd. "Humanitarian perspectives"
Founder: Ltd. "Humanitarian perspectives"
ISSN: 2078-5429